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WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1961
Statute consensual security will again be returned to its protected
status.8 Until then it is only possible to conclude that American Surety
has enabled the federal tax lien to become a more menacing threat in
the federal tax authorities' arsenal of weapons. Inherent in this deci-
sion is a more basic threat to the security of business transactions.
While the decline and possible destruction of the security interest is
only a remote possibility, reality dictates that credit will become avail-
able only on more onerous terms. After half a century of slumber,
perhaps it is time for Congress to re-establish protection for consensual
security. BEVERLY J. RoSENOW
Survival of Mortgage-lien on Conditional Vendees Interest Fol-
lowing Declaration of Forfeiture. In Norlin v. Montgomery1 the
Washington court (1) held that a mortgagee of the vendee's interest
under a forfeitable real estate contract has a lien on the equity of the
vendee, and (2) implied that the lien survives a default by the vendee
and a subsequent declaration of forfeiture by the vendor.
As vendee, defendant Montgomery entered a forfeitable real-estate
contract with Schy, the vendor. Vendee Montgomery then mortgaged
his equity in the contract to plaintiff-mortgagee Norlin who then re-
corded the mortgage. Thereafter, defendant Palmer purchased the
property from Schy and later loaned $1,500 to vendee Montgomery,
adding that amount to the real-estate contract payment schedule by
endorsement. Then vendee Montgomery defaulted, and Palmer gave
written notice of forfeiture. Montgomery executed a quitclaim deed to
Palmer with a provision which stated that the intention of the deed was
to cancel the contract. Mortgagee Norlin then offered to take over the
original Schy-Montgomery contract and to continue the original pay-
ment schedule not including the loan of $1,500. After Palmer refused
this offer, Norlin brought an action to foreclose his mortgage, and
Palmer filed a cross-complaint to quiet titie.
Ignoring the issue of Palmer's declaration of forfeiture, the court
held:
in Congress: H.R. 7914, H.R. 7915, S. 2305, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), and H.R.
4319, H.R. 4320, S. 1193, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). See explanation by Plumb,
supra note 13.
31 Security for obligatory, by contract or by necessity, future advances would be
entitled unconditionally to the same priority enjoyed under state law. The standard
of "choateness" would not be applied. See A.B.A. Report, supra note 30, at 65-67,
86-89.
1159 Wash. Dec. 280, 367 P.2d 621 (1961).
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(1) that Norlin, by virtue of his recorded mortgage, had a lien upon the
equity of Montgomery in the contract, as that equity existed at the date
of the mortgage; (2) that Mrs. Palmer could not abrogate the lien by
accepting a quit claim deed to the property from Montgomery for the
reason that, when Mrs. Palmer took the quit claim deed from Mont-
gomery, she received no better title to his equity in the contract than he
was able to convey, and (3) that the Norlin note and mortgage were in
default and Montgomery's equity in the contract was subject to forclosure
and sale under statutory law.2
In addition, the quitclaim deed was held not to have cancelled the con-
tract because Palmer accepted it with constructive notice of Norlin's
recorded mortgage, which encumbered Montgomery's equity in the
property.
Clearly the court was correct in its conclusion that the quitclaim
deed could neither convey away by deed, nor release through mutual
rescission, the mortgagee's interest because a quitclaim deed can only
convey or release what the grantor had (an interest subject to a mort-
gage).' The difficulty, however, results from the court's assumption
that it was faced with a mere conveyance problem. Whatever effect the
declaration of forfeiture had upon the parties has not been sufficiently
presented.
In order to reach the conveyance issue and to find that the lien sur-
vived, the court must necessarily have found that the contract had not
been forfeited. Otherwise the entire contract would be void,' and there
would have been no equity left in the contract upon which to assert the
lien. In Oregon it has been stated that the enforceability of a mortgage
on the vendee's interest, as a lien against the land, depends on the con-
dition that the contract remain in force by subsequent performance of
its terms.5
Although no Washington real estate contract cases have been found
expressly stating that a forfeiture does take place at the time of declara-
tion and without the aid of a court's decree, one case involving chattels
seems to assume that result. The court there stated that on the breach
of a conditional sale contract, the vendor has
a choice between inconsistent substantive rights which [it] ... had as
a conditional sale vendor, and over which its vendee had no control. It
is an election between... a contract and no contract. Plaintiff chose the
2Id. at 284, 367 P2d at 623-24.
3 RCW 64.04.050; Annot., 162 A.L.R. 556 (1946).
4See discussion in following paragraph.
5 Sheehan v. McKinstry, 105 Ore. 473, 210 Pac. 167 (1922).
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former. This it could do, and create the chosen relation with its vendee,
by inerely mking its desire to do so manifest.8 (Italics supplied.)
The Oregon court has said:
The aid of equity is not required in order to effect a forfeiture and will
not be given for that purpose.... [A]lthough in a proper suit to quiet
title or the like, equity might recognize that a forfeiture at law had been
previously effectuated. 7
Washington is in accord with the majority of states in recognizing strict
forfeiture provisions.
The right to declare a forfeiture is derived from the express agree-
ment of the parties. If they choose to make time the essence thereof
and provide for a forfeiture in the event of a breach of such covenant,
such provision are valid and enforcible [sic].8 [W]here time is made
of the essence of a contract of sale, the vendor may declare a forfeiture
of the contract for the nonpayment of the purchase price or any install-
ment thereof.Y
Although not articulated by the cases, the theory is that a forfeitable
contract becomes null and void according to its own terms at the time
a forfeiture is rightfully declared in the proper manner provided for in
the contract.
Therefore, in order for the lien to survive, assuming that Palmer had
the right to declare a forfeiture, the court in the Norlin case must have
found that equitable considerations precluded judicial recognition and
enforcement of the declared forfeiture. Strict forfeitures are usually
explained on a freedom of contract theory or on the proposition that
installment payments come to the vendor as his own and that he is
justified in treating them as such in making investments and expendi-
tures.10 Contrary arguments are asserted that forfeiture provisions
should be considered as penalty clauses because they are unfair to the
vendee whose money is forfeited. The decisions recognizing forfeiture
are often rationalized as more properly resting on the still existent right
of the vendor to demand specific performance or on the failure to show
6 Washington Co-op. Chick Ass'n v. Jacobs, 42 Wn.2d 460, 463-64, 256 P.2d 294,
296-97 (1953).7 Zumstein v. Stockton, 199 Ore. 633, 264 P2d 455, 459 (1953).
l'Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 NVn.2d 777, 782, 215 P.2d 425, 428 (1950).
o Dill v. Zielke, 26 Wn.2d 246, 252, 173 P.2d 977, 979-80 (1946). See State ex rel.
Foley v. Superior Court, 57 Wn.2d 571, 358 P.2d 550 (1961) ; Knoblauch v. Sanstrom,
37 Vn.2d 266, 223 P.2d 462 (1950) ; Knowles v. Anderson, 37 Wn2d 212, 222 P.2d 657(1950) ; Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wn.2d 777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950).10 CoRuiN, CoNmTAcTs §§ 1057, 1133 (1951).
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that the vendor's injury was less than the installments forfeited.1' The
Washington -rule, where time is made of the essence, is that the vendor
may declare a forfeiture of the contract for the non-payment of the
purchase price or any installment. But forfeitures are not favored in
law and are never enforced in equity unless the right thereto is so clear
as to permit no denial. 2
If the Washington court in Norlin v. Montgomery intended to relieve
against strict forfeiture because of unexpressed equitable considera-
tions, then a new mode of relief has been created, survival of a lien in
the mortgagee. The usual equitable relief granted has been: (1) ex-
tension of a period of grace in which the vendee could bring the pay-
ments up to date, 3 (2) a conditional decree that the contract will be
forfeited unless the vendee tenders the contract balance with interest
and all costs and expenses within a certain period, 4 or (3) a declara-
tion that the contract is forfeited, but allowance of a reasonable period
in which the vendee may reinstate the contract. 5 In each case for-
feiture results unless the vendee tenders performance. Norlin did in
fact loosely tender performance by offering to take over the contract,
but the court expressly disregarded this possibility for finding a tender
when it declared that the offer had no legal significance because Norlin's
interest could not vest until issuance of a sheriff's deed to him. The legal
result of the Norlin case is thus an unconditional relief against for-
feiture without requiring tender of performance. Such an important
change in the law would seem to merit a discussion of the equitable
considerations underlying the decision.
In determining whether equity will grant relief from strict forfeiture,
the Washington court in the past has balanced the equities, heavily
weighting any hardships on the vendee. 6 The most important factor
has been a substantial financial loss to the vendee if forfeiture is en-
forced, with no corresponding loss to the vendor if a period of grace is
allowed." Other considerations such as absence of wilful neglect, care-
" Id. § 1133.
12 State ex rel. Foley v. Superior Court, 57 Wn2d 571, 358 P2d 550 (1961);
Knoblauch v. Sanstrom, 37 Wn.2d 266, 223 P.2d 462 (1950); Knowles v. Anderson,
37 Wn2d 212, 222 P.2d 657 (1950) ; Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wn2d 777,
215 P.2d 425 (1950) ; Dill v. Zielke, 26 Wn.2d 246, 173 P2d 977 (1946).
13 Dill v. Zielke, 26 Wn2d 246, 173 P.2d 977 (1946).
14 State ex. rel. Foley v. Superior Court, 57 Wn.2d 571, 358 P.2d 550 (1961).
15 Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wn.2d 777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950) ; Bruckart
v. Cook, 30 Wn2d 4, 190 P.2d 725 (1948).
16 Dill v. Zielke, 26 Wn2d 246, 252, 173 P.2d 977, 980 (1946).
'- State ex rel. Foley v. Superior Court, 57 Wn.2d 571, 574, 358 P.2d 550, 552 (1961);
Dill v. Zielke, 26 Wn.2d 246, 173 P.2d 977 (1946).
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lessness or intentional delay in the default and a vendee's improve-
ments on the land are used as additional make-weight's.18
Before reviewing the basic equities of the case it must be determined
whether the mortgagee has standing to assert any equities at all, and if
he does, whose equities he may assert. In Krieg v. Salkovics9 forfei-
ture was granted against a purchaser from a vendee already in default
where there was no evidence of the equities in his favor. By analogy
and inverse reasoning it would seem that Norlin should, therefore, have
been able at least to assert his own equities. However, in Radach v.
Prior,0 the Krieg case was distinguished on the basis that the Krieg
vendee was a mere nominal party. In Radach a purchaser of one half
of the vendees' interest before default was allowed to assert the
vendees' equities because they were the real parties in interest.2' Since
the vendee in Norlin is not the real party in interest because of the
quitclaim deed,22 it follows that Norlin, the mortgagee, may be limited
to the assertion of his own equities. Even if Norlin could, it would avail
him little to stand on the vendee's equities. Assuming that the quit-
claim deed could not be rescinded for mistake, the vendee is discharged
from his obligations to Palmer," and the forfeiture could not affect his
obligation to the mortgagee since the forfeiture and the mortgage are
completely separate transactions.
Based on traditionally recognized equities the positions seem to be
about equally balanced between Palmer and Norlin-loss of a lien as
security for Norlin as against imposition of a lien on Palmer. Forfei-
ture would deprive the mortgagee of his mortgage lien and would limit
his remedies on the defaulted mortgage to those against the vendee-
mortgagor. Opposing this, denial of forfeiture would mean that Palmer,
in exchange for a cancellation of the contract and the right to keep the
$2,244 already paid, had subjected his property to a $1,770 lien, and
had given up $1,500 plus his right to collect the remaining contract
sum of $7,006. In view of the delicate balance between the parties, a
deeper analysis of the respective positions must be undertaken.
18 Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wn.2d 777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950) ; Bruckart
v. Cook, 30 Wn.2d 4, 190 P2d 725 (1945).
10 18 Wn2d 180, 138 P.2d 855 (1943).
20 48 Wn.2d 901, 297 P.2d 605 (1956).21 Due to the fact that a subsequent sale of the other half interest was conditioned on
failure of the forfeiture proceedings.
22 National Ass'n of Creditors, Inc. v. Menish, 144 Wash. 150, 257 Pac. 241 (1927)
(quit claim deed from vendees in default may be sufficient consideration for the release
of their obligation to pay).
23 Ibid.
1962]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
At first glance it seems odd that the mortgagee, whose interest must
be carved out of whatever interest the vendee had, is given a lien which
survives a default by the vendee and a declaration of forfeiture by the
vendor. Normally a grantee takes no greater interest than his grantor
had unless recording statutes or an estoppel are present. Several theo-
retical approaches are possible.
One element which the court weighted rather heavily was the fact
that Palmer took her assignment of the vendor's interest with construc-
tive knowledge of the mortgage. Because it is stated that the mortgage
was on the vendee's equity it appears that Norlin must have had notice
of the original Schy-Montgomery contract when he made his loan.
Therefore Norlin knew that his security was subject to forfeiture if the
vendee defaulted. Presumably then, the original vendor, Schy, had
rights superior to those of the mortgagee.24 This result obtains because
the vendee, by mortgaging his equity to a creditor who had notice of
the vendee's limited interest in the contract, could not create a greater
interest in a third person than he himself had. The court in Norlin,
however, seems to indicate that defendant Palmer cannot take full
advantage of the vendor's position because she took as an assignee of
the vendor's interest with constructive notice of the recorded mortgage.
A second possibility for avoiding forfeiture may have been found by
interpreting acceptance of the quitclaim deed as evidence of an intent
on the part of Palmer inconsistent with her declaration of forfeiture.
Arguably the acceptance of a quitclaim deed would indicate that the
vendor (assignee of the vendor here) did not really intend to declare a
forfeiture, and therefore the court will relieve against it. Although
theoretically it is impossible unilaterally to reinstate a contract after it
becomes null and void by declaration of forfeiture, the courts often
talk of a vendor having "waived" the forfeiture.25 Usually a "waiver"
is found, in order to avoid the unfavored strict forfeiture of a contract,
where payments are received after the declaration of forfeiture or
where other indulgences are granted.26 The basic element establishing
"waiver," however, is later conduct inconsistent with an earlier intent
to declare a forfeiture. The operation of the quitclaim deed in can-
celling the contract is thus treated as essentially a mutual rescission.
The participation of Palmer in accepting the quitclaim deed could
24 Simonson v. Wenzel, 27 N.D. 638, 147 N.W. 804 (1914) (held that original vendor
manifestly had rights superior to those of the mortgagee).25 Moeller v. Good Hope Farms, Inc., 35 Wn.2d 777, 215 P.2d 425 (1950).26 Id. at 782, 215 P.2d at 428.
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have indicated her belief that some rights or interest still remained
in the vendee even after declaration of forfeiture. It is more likely,
however, that the quitclaim deed was taken in order to increase the
marketability of Palmer's title by destroying any possible cloud which
the vendee's interest would create. In that case any inconsistency in
conduct would obviously disappear as would the above possibility of
relief from forfeiture.
Conceivably a third rationalization may be founded on the theory
that the declaration of forfeiture was more closely analogous to a
mutual rescission. This conclusion would result if the declaration of
forfeiture were converted into an acceptance of the vendee's offer to
rescind implied from his default. Even though Norlin accepted the
mortgage knowing that it was subject to the vulnerability of a forfeit-
able contract, the fact that Palmer took an assignment of the vendor's
interest with notice of the mortgage could result in her having less
freedom to declare a forfeiture than the original vendor had. The
element of wilfulness in the vendee's ability to destroy the security for
the mortgage by defaulting in payment of installments, combined with
the voluntary exercise of Palmer's option to declare a forfeiture on
default, could have been considered so unfair that an equity court was
unwilling to recognize the strict forfeiture as between Norlin and
Palmer.
Balancing all the equities and considerations discussed above it is
at least arguable that relief from strict forfeiture should not have
resulted from the court's decree recognizing the survival of the mort-
gage as a lien. The complete absence of judicial discussion of the for-
feiture issue directs the conclusion that the result should at least be
re-examined when the opportunity next arises. HARTLEY PAUL
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
County-imposed Real Estate Sales Tax-Applicability to Corpor-
ate Transfers in Dissolution. Extending the reasoning in Deer Park
Pine Indus., Inc. v. Stevens County,1 Doric Co. v. King County2 holds
that a distribution of a dissolved corporation's sole asset to its sole
shareholder, who does not assume an existing debt of the corporation,
146 Wn.2d 852, 286 P2d 98 (1955).
2 57 Wn.2d 640, 358 P2d 972 (1961).
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